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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyze the operational model adopted by the artisanal transport 
operators of the Metropolitan Region of Goiania, the division in two different 
periods is required. The first one goes from service operation start-up in August 
1999 to the issuance of precarious authorizations by the government in 
September 2000. During this time, the Union of Artisanal Transporters 
(SINTRAGO) was the regulating authority. The second period begins with the 
issuance of precarious authorizations, in January 2001, and ends with the 
beginning of the collective transport-restructuring project of the Metropolitan 
Region of Goiania in December 2001, with the public regulatory agency and 
administrator during that period being AGR – Goiania Agency for Regulation, 
Control and Inspection of Public Services. 
 
A survey was carried out for such an analysis and the standards and rules that 
governed the urban collective transport of the Metropolitan Region of Goiania 
from 1999 to 2003 were also gathered, highlighting those that had a direct 
impact on the operation and production. Among these documents are the 
Deliberations issued by the Granting Authorities, CDTC – Deliberative 
Chamber of Collective Urban Transport of the Metropolitan Region of Goiania, 
the rules and standards implemented by SINTRAGO, the Cooperatives and the 
lines. The following items were defined as parameters for study analyses: 
• Participation and social control in administration; 
• Inspection and quality assurance for the provided service; 
• Planning of the operation and the parameters for service mobility; 
• Criteria for issuing the precarious and provisional authorizations; 
• Competition between the conventional and artisanal modes. 
 
1.1. Main aspects of collective transport service operation 
 
As a constitutional provision in Brazil, the public collective passenger road 
transport is understood as a public service, demanding, therefore, explicit 
approval from the appropriate federal entity. The internal services of a city are 
under the autonomy of the local municipality, while those linking two 
municipalities pertaining to the same state are under state jurisdiction and 
those crossing the borders between two states are under the Union’s 
administration. Officially, services provided without approval are not 
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recognized, although since the second half of the nineties, the rise and 
expansion of these services in a large number of Brazilian towns of all sizes 
have been possible. In those cities, the regulation is usually carried out based 
on old contracts, with very long duration, not submitted to the previous 
bidding process. Such contracts, associated to regulations that inhibit not only 
market competition but also the competition for the market, in practice, remain 
ad infinitum and create severe barriers to the entry of new operators. 
 
Price formation based on the average cost and the guarantee of economical and 
financial balance for the enterprise, for its part, leads to inefficiency which, in 
time, results in the relative increase in tariffs and ends up turning away users 
as well as in attracting operators even outside the legal sphere. 
 
Oliveira (1989) defines regulation as being one of the tools used by the 
administrator to intervene in the market economy. It is a case of activity 
normalization, in other words, a set of rules set forth and applied by the 
administrator to the sector and which should govern the behavior of the 
productive agent and its inter-relations with the environment, as well as the 
main characteristics of the service. This tool, edited by the administrator 
should allow him/her to control some or all of these aspects: 
• Activity management; 
• Systematization of its nature, development and marketing conditions; 
• Standardization of the service’s main characteristics; 
• Definition of relationship forms between its executives, the consumers 
and the agency responsible for applying the regulations. 
 
For VISCUSI et al. (1995), although economical regulations may comprise 
many variables like for example, product quality, performance and investment 
made,  three variables are highlighted: those referring to control, orders and 
restrictions on the company’s decisions on price, quantity, and market entry 
and exit. These ideas were complemented by SANTOS (2000). He considers the 
following among the regulation measures: 
• Market entry and exit controls; 
• Controls of quality and quantity of production; 
• Fixing or controlling prices, rates, and profitability. 
 
According to BARBOZA (2002), when the State establishes rules for the 
artisanal transport sector, these must be for economic development and 
adjustment of the market’s imbalances, intended to obtaining maximum 
efficiency in provision of services and ensuring the social well-being. This way, 
the users would be provided a more efficient and effective service and the 
operators would guarantee their economical and financial balance. 
 
2. ARTISANAL TRANSPORT IN THE METROPOLITAN REGION OF GOIANIA 
At the national level, a combination of factors can be pointed out to explain the 
reason why, in such a short time, the artisanal transport service managed to 
invade the passenger transport system. The Brazilian recessionary crisis in the 
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beginning of the nineties brought about a non-negligible movement towards 
informal labor relations in all markets. In the transport sector, besides the loss 
of quality in the regular service, the facilities created for importing vehicles 
were another significant factor. Reinforced by the strong Brazilian currency vis-
à-vis the U.S. dollar, the market opening made vans, especially those 
manufactured in South East Asia, an affordable asset. The high unemployment 
rates and the move to dismantle the State, which led former civil servants to 
the informal economy, took care of the rest. With their compensation checks, 
they were the first to invest in the attractive market of clandestine transport 
that seemed to be a promising revenue source that had all the conditions, they 
believed, to be inexhaustible (RIBEIRO, 2004). 
 
Thus, new collective transport services operated by these low capacity vehicles 
and in full informal conditions emerged in the large Brazilian urban centers. 
Operated initially as chartered trips to meet specific demands, they began to 
identify market niches in regular service (BALASSIANO and BRAGA, 2000). The 
bad quality of regular service, especially its low supply in rush hours, led these 
self-employed operators to compete in some routes. Higher vehicle supply, 
smaller and more comfortable vehicles and with similar price motivated the 
users to shift to this new transport mode, bringing about the so-called 
artisanal transport. 
 
The changes that occurred in the urban collective transport system of the 
Metropolitan Region of Goiania in the nineties, were not sufficient to meet the 
wishes of users, resulting in a crisis in the system at the end of the decade. In 
the same period, the Brazilian economy suffered one of its major crises, which 
shook the Brazilian economical structure and the employment market. The 
conditions were perfect and the informality existing in other sectors of the 
economy appeared in the urban collective transport in the end of 1999. 
Alternative transport, operated by self-employed drivers who claimed the right 
to work for sustaining the family, was a reality on city roads (RIBEIRO, 2004). 
 
2.1. First Operation Period: August 1999 to September 2000 
Since the commencement of operations, the operators were organized in one 
entity, SINTRAGO. CROSS (2001) says that this form of a union organization is 
a characteristic of the informal sector where the employer is not well defined, 
territoriality is high and threats are well defined, factors that lead to an easier 
organization than in other segments. 
 
The role performed by this entity had strong similarities with the role of public 
administration bodies. It consisted in a guarantee concerning the compliance 
with the social role of the system, in encouraging and controlling people 
participation, in optimizing and rationalizing the service, implementing 
operational rules, regulations and standards, and in inspecting the system. 
 
Approximately 150 Kombi type vehicles and vans operated in the first months, 
linking routes overlapping the conventional system’s main lines, which had 
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then about 1,100 vehicles transporting 20 million passengers per month. 
Without undergoing profound structural changes, the conventional system, 
which is trunk fed, became weak in the face of this new mode of transport that 
operated without integration and transfer in the scrap Integration Terminals, 
where users wasted a lot of time and had little comfort.  
 
Soon after commencing operations, SINTRAGO structured planning and 
control mechanisms and instruments that could ensure a control of the service 
rendered by its associates and to regulate the entry of new vehicles in the 
market. This planning and control structure was supported by three 
departments: Technical, Operational and Inspection. Although there were other 
organizations representing artisanal transport, none had the size of SINTRAGO 
and they had similar management models. 
 
In the beginning of 2000, the Technical Department had three engineers with 
post-graduation in transport and four transport technicians, responsible for 
planning the operation of the service to be provided. Their powers were a mix of 
public administrator and private operator responsibilities: (i) feasibility study 
for new lines; (ii) dimensioning the new and current lines; (iii) implementing the 
time-table; (iv) defining quality parameters for vehicles in operation; (v) help 
prepare system regulations; (vi) implementing cost control tools, etc. Among the 
functions performed by this sector the following must be highlighted: (i) 
creation of lines with radial and circular routes without overlapping the 
conventional system; (ii) study of new vehicular technologies with the option of 
using minibuses with 23 seats to replace the vans; (iii) preparation of 
inspection regulations; (iv) creation of a daily control booklet for vehicle costs 
and receipts; (v) conduction of statistical schedule studies for defining the time-
table of lines. 
 
The Operational Department’s activity was focused on control of the service 
operation, an essentially business activity developed only by the cooperative 
associates, without contracted technicians. The operational model was based 
on those set out by local companies. The lines had a control point in each 
neighborhood fully structured in rented offices, where an operator 
subordinated to the Cooperative was allocated the task of recording in a proper 
form the time, number of trips and passengers in the vehicles. The lines were 
divided in Groups and a Director was made responsible for each Group. The 
innovation in this operational model consisted of a more intense participation 
of operators in the administration. The model inspired in the one existing in 
Porto Alegre designated one leader per line. These line leaders, referred to as 
Line Deputy, were usually elected by the representatives, were self-employed 
operators and had as responsibility the administrative and operational control 
of the line and representation of cooperative associates in the representative 
entities. The leaders met with the Union ordinarily once a week to discuss 
existing problems. 
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RIBEIRO (2004) carried out a survey in 2002 (error margin of 6.5% and 
confidence interval of 95%), which numerically describes these coordination 
aspects of the Operational Department. Table 1 shows that of the 74 existing 
lines more than 80% had a Line Deputy and most of the time (82%) they were 
elected by the grantees themselves (Table 2). 
 
Table 1 
 Line Leader 
li h
Total %
Yes 59 80.4%
No 15 19.6%
Total 74 100%  
Table 2 
 Position Takeover Total %
Elected 49 82.2%
Cooperative Indication 11 17.8%
Total 59 100%  
 
The majority (96%) of Line Deputies was considered by the other line grantees 
as active (Table 3). This fact led to a larger participation in the system 
administration and indicates that there are constituted and active elements 
that can contribute to an ongoing search for service improvement. The main 
functions related to Line Deputies are described in Table 4, where inspection 
and organizing are highlighted as key functions. 
 
Table 3 
 Leader is active Total %
Yes 57 95.6%
No 3 4.4%
Total 59 100%  
 
 
Table 4 
 Leader functions Total %
Inspection
 
29 28.
Organization 28 27.3%
Coordination 15 14.3%
Resolving conflicts 15 14.3%
Representation 9 9.1%
Regulation 7 6.5%  
 
According to Table 5, most of the lines (93%) carried out Periodic Meetings. In 
accordance with Table 6, these were coordinated by the Deputy in most of the 
lines (55%), by the cooperative in 38% of the lines and by the indicator in other 
cases (7%). In the lines where there was no Line Deputy, the Meeting was 
coordinated by the cooperative. Besides these periodic meetings, meetings were 
carried out with the cooperatives in 75% of the lines (Table 7). 
 
 6
Table 5 
 Periodic Meetings Total %
Yes 69 92.9%
No 5 7.1%
Total 74 100%  
Table 6 
 Meeting coordinator Total 
Indicator 5 6.5%
Cooperative 29 38.4%
Deputy 42 55.2%  
Table 7 
 Meeting  w/ coop Total %
Yes 56 75.0%
No 19 25.0%
Total 74 100%  
 
 
Tables 1 through 7 demonstrate the existence of a high degree of worker 
participation in production management. Empirical studies quoted by 
FAVERET in the debate in GRZYBONSKI et al (1998) demonstrate that 
democratization of capital is enhanced when a participative production 
management exists, causing significant increase in performance indicators in 
the positive sense. 
 
All individuals, even those belonging to an organization or group, have purely 
individual interests that differ from the interest of others. Thus, although all 
group members aim at achieving collective benefits, each one is ready to pay a 
different price for the provision of this collective benefit. There is thus a 
difference between the forces that impel individual actions and collective 
actions, especially when the interest of the community is at stake in instances 
and forums pertaining to the public sphere, before the public welfare. It is 
possible to say that this differentiation is due to the calculation of participation 
costs or those of the non-participation and distribution of the public welfare 
and wrongdoing OLSON (1999). 
 
OLSON’s principle can be empirically noticed in the vehicle distribution model 
of self-employed operators in the lines, who had a strong tendency towards 
internal corporatism and concentration of vehicles pertaining to the leaders 
and people close to them in the lines with higher demand. The survey carried 
out by RIBEIRO (2004) also confirms this principle, as can be seen in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
 Inadequate behavior assessment True False 
Excess of Speed 
 
93% 7% 
Non-qualified persons working 93% 7% 
Aggressive driving and running over 89% 11% 
Transporting standing people 88% 12% 
Refusal to transport elderly people and students 83% 17% 
Unfair competition among alternative means 78% 22% 
Traffic worsening in downtown 37% 63%  
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The third existing structure is the Inspection Department, which is responsible 
for verifying and ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of parameters defined 
for the system. This attribution is essentially public in nature. We can highlight 
as its duties: (i) inspecting the vehicles that intend to join the system; (ii) 
removing from circulation, vehicles that do not have the quality parameters 
established; (iii) inhibiting the uncontrolled expansion of the system; (iv) 
preventing the employees from taking two work shifts daily; (v) ensuring the 
transport for users with the right to free transport and half fare etc. This 
management structure ensured the system a significant quality level of the 
service provided during the period of clandestine operation. 
 
The users, as against public authorities and operators, welcomed the artisanal 
transport system with great joy. Not just because it represented a new 
transport option and a significant improvement in service, but also for its 
participative management model that respects its workers and let them 
participate in service planning. As an example for this respect to the 
community rights is the free transport of people with special needs and elderly 
people, as well as the levy of half fare for students. It is important to emphasize 
that in many towns, the artisanal transport did not incorporate the privileges 
enjoyed by users in the conventional transport system. We must also mention 
operation planning, which was done jointly with community associations to 
define itineraries, time-tables and operational fleet. 
 
The partnership projects between the community and the self-employed 
operators gave rise to two new operations: Corujão and Conduz Ir, that 
redeemed the right to use the services offered in the town by a portion of the 
society. The collective transport night service, Corujão, complemented daytime 
service operation, and the Conduz Ir Project made available for users with 
special needs, a transport service well adjusted to their requirements. The 
result was the guarantee to night workers, to low-income population and to a 
large portion of people with special needs, of a service more adapted to their 
needs. 
 
Trying to solve the illegal status of the service that was being provided by the 
self-employed operators, the public authorities established a police control as 
the first policy to be adopted, implemented by means of applying fines to the 
owners, apprehending vehicles and repressing with violent actions those who 
were irregularly exploring this type of passenger transport. Five repression 
facts stand out, all confirmed by the operators (Table 9): 
• In 1999, in the first months of artisanal transport operation, the public 
authorities threatened to apprehend the vehicles for commercial 
passenger transport; as a reaction, the operators operated during a 
certain period without charging for the transport service; 
• In the end of 1999, the leaders started a hunger strike to press the 
Governor for service legalization, in front of Palácio das Esmeraldas, 
the state government’s headquarters; 
 8
• During the hunger strike period, in a confrontation between the police 
and pro-alternative-transport demonstrators in the UFG Campus, a 
service operator died, victim of a rubber bullet from a Military 
Policeman; 
• The government decided to legalize the service after the incident, but 
authorizing only the microbus type vehicles, which led the operators to 
two new demonstrations. A siege was made on the Mayor’s house with 
minibuses while the vans operated and finally the Civic Square, the 
central point for the municipal transport network, was blocked. Both 
the movements received demonstrations of support from the 
population. 
 
Table 9 
 Position regarding political manifestations (2000) In Favor Against Indifferent
Free transport for one day 92% 1% 7%
Hunger Strike in the Civic Square 88% 4% 8%
Demonstration in Campus with death of José Marcos 84% 3% 12%
Siege of the Mayor’s house – Nion Albernaz 82% 6% 13%
Blockage of the civic square with 100 buses 93% 1% 6%  
 
The government finally surrendered to the demands of the society and the 
informal operators were granted, in mid 2000, the authorization to operate the 
service, but without due service regulations, support to entities that could 
unite these operators, professional qualification, financing sources, etc., 
depriving them of a pro-active public policy. The public absence was also 
apparent in the non-regulation of citizenship services – Corujão and Conduz Ir – 
weakening their operation.  
 
The process of issuing the precarious and provisional authorization 
(Deliberations - CDTC 02/2000 and 05/2001) had the strong intermediation of 
the representative entities related to public authorities and three negative facts 
marked this period: 
• Defining the number of vehicles through a political and non-technical 
criterion increased their number from 420 to 740 operating vehicles; 
• The possibility of transferring the initial registration to another person 
–Term of Consent; 
• Strong accusations that persons who were not really working were 
receiving authorizations in detriment to those operating. 
The questions presented in Table 10 demonstrate the perception of the 
grantees about these facts. 
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Table 10 
 Authorization distribution assessment True False No opinion
Some received without taking part in the movement 86% 10% 5%
Some sold it 79% 16% 5%
Large utilization of consent term 70% 21% 9%
Lobby in distribution 67% 24% 9%
Some paid for the authorization 62% 30% 8%  
 
The public policy directives of the government for the collective transport 
system were set forth in the Transporte Cidadão (Citizen Transport) Program 
launched in August 2000 by the Government of the State of Goiás. It had 
among its express goals, to positively intervene in the quality standards of 
collective transport in the RMG – Metropolitan Region of Goiania (Deliberation - 
CDTC 001/2000). For this purpose, it proposed amendments in the system’s 
aspects related to planning, control, service inspection and infrastructure. 
 
Chapter 3 of this Deliberation, referred to as Opening of the Market to 
Competition, is based on the principle that the market regulates itself tending 
towards an improvement in the conditions of price and quality of the service or 
product offered and proposes a market segmentation by means of opening and 
stimulating competition. This measure triggered a series of consequences to 
the collective transport market and in none of them is it possible to observe an 
improvement in the quality of the service rendered. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the improvement in the system infrastructure. 
Although the measures have never come into effect, they benefited only one of 
the modes, the conventional one, thus directing the State’s action and support 
towards this system. 
 
In the survey about the main difficulties faced (Table 11), problems due to 
absence of regulatory mechanisms by the public administration were 
mentioned by 74% of the grantees. Problems caused by competition appear in 
the items Low profit (60%), increased competition (57%) and lack of customers 
(12%). One aspect that appears in the survey of the difficulties is related to 
obtaining credit (14%). In the national IBGE (The Brazilian Geographical and 
Statistical Institute) survey in 1999, the lack of customers stands out, with 
28% globally and 34% for the transport service sector, followed by strong 
competition/ problems with inspection at 25% in general and 19% in transport 
services. 
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Table 11 – Difficulties in the last year  
 
 
The precarious and provisional authorizations were attributed to each operator 
individually, with informal intervention by the cooperatives, without however, a 
later regulation contemplating the Trade Union or the Cooperatives related to 
this and its function in the artisanal transport system, and the relationship of 
these with the Government is entirely informal.  Thus, the absence of public 
regulatory mechanisms and the fragmentation due to the absence of a 
regulation stimulating the constitution of an organizational structure by line or 
by group of operators resulted in the representative entities not being able to 
provide a suitable service to the grantees. 
 
Strictly speaking, 740 new companies and business cultures came into 
existence, dividing themselves into leasing and financing, those that changed 
the line of business, those that lost the working capital, those that cannot 
suffer losses and need to bear the expenses and have little knowledge of the 
market in which they operate. This entrepreneur started to compete not only in 
the market, but within the line itself, causing each one to act individually in 
the operation of the system and to compete among themselves for a place in 
this market. 
 
A few groups of artisanal transporters continued associated with the Unions 
and Cooperatives and together sought to improve the mechanisms that allowed 
more efficient controls of services and guarantee a minimum quality level; 
however, there were independent operators too within the same line. 
  
In the survey, the general organization of the line was shown in two distinct 
modes: the first questions if it tried to organize the operation and the second, if 
this operation is organized. In the grantees’ perception, in 93% of the lines 
there were attempts to organize the operation, but were successful in only 67% 
of the lines (Table 12). Non-participation of everyone in the process of 
organizing the operation becomes evident while checking the implementation of 
Total %
Problems with public administration 544 73.6%
Low profit 442 59.8%
Very stiff competition 421 56.9%
Lack of own capital 162 21.8%
Lack of credit 102 13.8%
Lack of customers 85 11.5%
Other difficulties 30 4.0%
Total 740 241%
612 said they faced two difficulties and 433 faced three difficulties
Difficulties currently faced 
(12 months)
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the norms. The existence of the norms is mentioned by 91% of the grantees but 
67% admit that not all comply with them.  
 
Table 12 – Assessment of the operation of the line 
 
 
 
A new mechanism created by a few groups within the most organized grantees 
was the compensation chamber per line, putting an end to the internal dispute 
for receipts and passengers. In spite of the beginning, with only 25% of the 
lines, the implementation of this mechanism made the reordering and 
organization in other bases possible. 
 
 3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Incorporating the new model of public administration and regulating all the 
existing problems regarding regulation, management, society’s participation, 
etc. also brings new challenges and behaviors. At that time, what was an 
alternative, a rejection of the prevailing system by popular choice, became the 
system and to compete for passengers in lines. In a more concrete manner, the 
grantees have become apathetic to transporting passengers for free, and only 
think about making their undertaking economically viable, even without 
planning and a proper and specific model.  
 
With the weakening of a part of its social projects and with the population 
beginning to abandon this system, this important social movement fights for 
survival, sustaining itself only by its theoretical reference, and finds itself and 
the whole model of popular participation and respect to social rights that it had 
tried to construct, threatened. 
 
Assessment of the operation of the line Yes No 
Operation is organized 67% 33%
Organization of operation was attempted 93% 7%
Operating norms exist 91% 9%
Everyone obeys the norm 33% 67%
There is a starting scale 98% 2%
There is an operational worksheet 92% 8%
Operation is from 5AM to 11PM 74% 26%
There is a timekeeper and he is essential 91% 9%
There is a leader elected by the cooperative members 81% 19%
The leader is a performer 71% 29%
Grantees meet periodically 78% 22%
Cooperatives visit the line every week 35% 65%
There are vehicles in excess 42% 58%
There is a compensation chamber 24% 76%
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It can be observed that the first time the regulatory power was exercised by the 
organization of autonomous transporters, which guaranteed the economic and 
financial balance of the system under the private vision and not of a public 
service. But, it also guaranteed the user community, participation in the 
management and incorporated in the system of collective transport new 
services, which possessed a strong social bearing, such as, night service and 
transport of the people with special needs in addition to consolidating the 
gratuities and discounts in the transport of elderly people and students. 
 
The second moment had as its starting point, the dispute for the market 
between the conventional and artisanal service as a means of improving quality 
and lowering the tariffs for the users. In practice, the control of service was 
made solely and exclusively by field inspectors, as there were no indicators to 
assess the efficacy and efficiency of the service, and there were no mechanisms 
for user participation in the control of the service. Another salient point was 
the distribution of the authorization individually, resulting in a real 
disintegration of the existing cooperatives. 
 
The absence of efficient public and private policies for the new transport 
market setup in RMG (Metropolitan Region of Goiania) was easily noted by the 
operators and users, as well as the evident lack of sincerity in several 
processes, contrary to the principles of solidarity. This leads us to conclude 
that: 
• The perception of the fact that some were privileged in detriment to 
the others in distribution of authorizations, excluding even people 
who previously used to operate, points to the predominance of a 
economic and capitalist imbalance and not of a social movement for 
inclusion and participation of the excluded in the employment market 
and to sustain the family; 
• The same is also noted when a part of the grantees position 
themselves contrary to determined regulatory items – make it 
mandatory for grantees to drive the vehicle, transport standees, 
vehicle capacity of 23 passengers and the release of the sale of 
authorization; 
• The principles of opening of the market were the factors that 
contributed to the price war, with the worsening of the transport 
conflicts and the refusal to transport free travelers and students (half 
fare);  
• The local government’s failure in promoting and providing support to 
the structuring of the sector is not only seen in the absence of a 
regulation, but also in the non-opening of special credit for the sector, 
in the lack of technical support and in the low incentive for 
qualification; 
• Stiff competition, as was prevailing in the market, makes it impossible 
to optimize the system, increase the supply of services and reduce the 
demand with an immediate impact on the tariffs in the system, as the 
existing tariff composition model still uses the average cost method; 
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• Despite the absence of public policies based on the local 
administration’s initiatives, several actions and measures were made 
by the grantees in an attempt to structure a model that would be 
appropriate to their reality; 
• At this moment, there is service difficult to control, difficult to 
standardize, difficult to draw up itineraries, as there are 740 small 
companies working individually and which are unable to comply with 
the role of producing and organizing the service, standardizing 
employment, production, vehicle, tire, training, etc; 
• There were tools and elements capable of structuring the coordination 
of an operation in the line structures: Line Deputy, Operational 
Worksheet, Regulation, Periodic Meetings and Timekeeper, which were 
used by the grantees in the two moments; 
• In a part of the lines, the artisanal transport operation was well 
structured in the two moments and had a few operational elements 
similar to those used by the Brazilian bus operators; 
• The non-association of the lines to the cooperatives gave the grantee 
higher flexibility, enabling him to choose at any time whether to 
associate or not with the Union or the Cooperatives. This flexibility, 
however, made it impossible for the cooperatives to coordinate the 
operation, unify services or standardize and improve customer service. 
The results were disorganization of the operations, low productivity 
and fall in turnover; 
• The possibility of the cooperatives operating together could be possible 
only through a partnership between these entities, which often hurts 
corporatism and the existing individual interest inside each of these 
organizations; 
• The absence of a management strategy and objectivity weakened the 
success of the initiatives of the public policies by a section of the 
grantees, mainly because they did not structure themselves in order 
to have a decisive solution for the problem. 
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